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This paper reviews compliance with the IAS 36 goodwill impairment testing disclosure 
requirements by South African entities included in the All Share Index of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. A detailed extraction of disclosures provided by entities with material levels of 
goodwill was compared to the key requirements.  The approach taken is grounded in an assumption 
that the diligence with which preparers attend to visible disclosures acts a “litmus test” of the 
reliability of the invisible workings of the “black box” of impairment testing.  The results are 
analysed through a critical narrative proposing insights relevant to preparers, auditors, regulators, 
and standard-setters.  Consistent with results of studies in other jurisdictions the disclosures of 
South African entities are often incomplete and inconsistent, presented in a minimalist, generic, 
"boiler-plate" fashion considered to be of limited use to decision makers assessing the reliability 
of impairment testing. This is the first known detailed review of South African levels of 
compliance with goodwill impairment testing disclosure requirements offered as an initial 
contribution to assessing the reliability of goodwill balances reported by South African corporate 
entities. 
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An indication of the challenges presented by accounting for goodwill is provided by this extract 
from an address by the Chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB): 
“goodwill is a mix of many things, including the internally generated goodwill of the acquired 
company and the synergy that is expected from the business combination.  Usually, there is real 
value there, but nobody knows exactly how much.  Most elements of goodwill are highly uncertain 
and subjective and they often turn out to be illusory” (Hoogervorst, 2012).   
 
This reticence by the Chairman to robustly warrant the reliability of the value of goodwill 
manifests itself as unreserved cynicism in the pages of the influential publications, The Financial 
Times and The Economist. The Financial Times (Ford, 2018) characterises goodwill as a “hope 
value” and impairments as optional due to the discretion afforded managers to effectively monitor 
their own efforts unrestrained by acquiescent auditors.  This optionality is seen to have real costs 
to creditors by enabling management and shareholders to receive inappropriate bonuses and 
dividends not justified by the underlying reality of the company.  If greater confidence in the 
reported values is desired, then changes to the accounting rules are indicated.  The Financial Times 
(Lex, 2010) is even more forthright in the aftermath of the great recession strongly suggesting that 
the reason for the surprisingly low incidence of impairments is the familiar, unchallenging 
relationship auditors have with clients. The Economist (2013) similarly impugns the 
ineffectiveness of auditors in standing up to their clients but has harsher words for the contrary 
actions of management - when impairments occur management is seen to dismiss them as mere 
accounting adjustments with no cash outflows yet equally is seen to take great lengths to avoid 
these ostensibly irrelevant impairments. 
 
It should be of great concern to the accounting profession that these eminent publications express 
such a lack of faith in the reliability of an important aspect of financial reporting.  It is opined that 
financial reporting, as with the metaphorical chain, is only as strong as its weakest link.  If users 
doubt some elements of financial reports it seems reasonable to assume this doubt could spread 




This paper aims to contribute to the debate required to achieve credibility with regard to goodwill 
accounting by providing an assessment of the goodwill impairment testing disclosure practices of 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).  A brief overview is provided of the 
nature and significance of goodwill and the related impairment testing and prior research in other 
jurisdictions into the levels of compliance with the mandatory disclosure requirements.  The 
specific data and methodology employed in this paper will be presented, followed by a detailed 
analysis of the findings.  The paper will conclude with an assessment of the results and the 
opportunities for future research arising from these findings. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
Goodwill, or to be precise, purchased goodwill, which is distinct from internally generated 
goodwill, arises when a business combination occurs for which International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) 3 Business Combinations compels the acquiring entity to use the acquisition 
method (IASB, 2018a).  Goodwill is defined as an asset representing the future economic benefits 
arising from the other assets acquired that are not identified individually and recognised separately. 
The Basis for Conclusions in IFRS 3 describes six components that could comprise goodwill with 
component six, overpayment, being highly relevant to impairment testing.  Also, of importance 
are the components seen to comprise core goodwill.  Component three, is the fair value of the 
going concern element of the existing business acquired. Component four relates to the synergies 
and other benefits expected to be derived.  A subsequent need to impair goodwill, likely indicates 
poor performance related to acquisitions with adverse implications for CEO compensation 
(Darrough, Guler, & Wang, 2014).  Management therefore has a vested interest in avoiding 
impairments related to acquisitions they were involved in acquiring or managing. 
 
The bland language used in IFRS 3 to describe goodwill does not reflect the controversy and 
passion that goodwill has engendered in the past and continues to do so.  Disagreement stems from 
two questions (Bloom, 2008) – first, is goodwill an asset; and second, if so, should it be amortised? 
The latest situation – though perhaps not final resolution if the title of the European Financial 
Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG)’s report “Should Goodwill Still Not Be Amortised? 
Accounting and Disclosure for Goodwill” (EFRAG, 2014) is any indication – came about in 2004 
with the adoption of IFRS 3 and revisions to IAS 36 Impairment of Assets.  This mandated the use 
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of the purchase method and eliminated the amortisation of goodwill over the assessed useful life 
instead requiring an annual impairment test.  International studies indicating that this change has 
been value relevant are supported by studies by Eloff and de Villiers (2015) and Omarjee and 
Garnett (2017) that indicates this also applies in the South African context. 
 
An impairment exists if the carrying amount exceeds the recoverable amount which is the higher 
of value in use (VIU) and fair value less costs of disposal (FVLCD).  The mechanics of each 
method are not reviewed here except to note that both afford management considerable discretion 
due to the unverifiable nature of the future projections involved.  This discretion, common to both 
US GAAP and IFRS impairment testing, could enable managers to convey private information 
that expected future cash flows are such that impairment is not required (Ramanna & Watts, 2012).  
Contrary to this, managers may, consistent with agency theory, exploit the dependence of the 
impairment test on management estimates.    
 
In an IFRS context, the European financial regulator, European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) (2013), notes that a book equity to market ratio exceeding 100% can indicate that assets 
are impaired.  While recognising that this is only one indicator of possible impairment which does 
not inevitably result in impairment, ESMA questioned whether the impact of the financial and 
economic crisis had been adequately captured in the financial statements examined.   
 
It is suggested that this reliance on market prices to indicate impairment is an unsatisfactory 
reversal of the intended roles – financial reports should communicate impairments to users in a 
timely manner rather than belatedly process accounting impairments for the economic impairments 
already assessed by the market.  Additionally, strong performance in most areas of an entity can 
mask indicated impairments for individual cash-generating units (CGUs).  Addressing this issue, 
Ji (2013), using a disaggregated analysis to identify “mini-firms”, found the absence of impairment 
despite poor performance indicative of impairment delay and avoidance.  
 
The bulk of the IFRS research – such as Carlin and Finch (2007, 2011), D’Alauro (2013), Glaum, 
Schmidt, Street, & Vogel., (2013), Mazzi, André, Dionysiou, & Tsalavoutas (2017) – has focused 
on disclosures consistent with the motivation in IAS 36 BC201 to require information to assist 
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users’ evaluation of the reliability of goodwill. Carvalho, Rodriques, & Ferreira (2016), in their 
critical analysis of the literature, on disclosures of goodwill and related impairment testing, 
published from 2002 to mid-2015, classify the studies into three sub-groups.  The first adopts the 
use of a, weighted or not, disclosure index; the second involves a descriptive analysis of disclosure 
practices and compliance; and, the third comprises reports from major institutions and professional 
firms.  The typical items tested were CGU identification and allocation, recoverable amount 
method, discount and growth rates, period covered, and sensitivity analysis.  Poor compliance is 
seen across a range of countries indicating the presence of systemic rather than individual national 
issues.  A common thread is the tendency to reproduce generic, rather than provide specific, 
information.  A noteworthy observation is the absence of research into the relevance to the 
financial markets of the required disclosures (Carvalho et al., 2016).   
 
In this paper a descriptive analysis approach is adopted.  This paper borrows from the approach 
followed by Carlin and Finch (2011), in challenging the apparent compliance with discount 
disclosure requirements suggesting that the use of the same discount rate for all testing units is not 
consistent with the requirement to adapt the discount rate to the risk profile followed by the 
particular testing unit.  This has been extended to the other disclosure requirements reviewed with 
the aim of reviewing whether prima facie compliance represents effective compliance consistent 
with the information needs of users.  The often-binary scoring of impairment disclosures reported 
used in some studies is not considered optimal to capture the range of diverse responses that entities 
have reported.  Scoring is seen to have merit where insights on correlations or causation are sought 
or where a comparison across country, auditor, industry, or size is desired.  The aim of this paper 
is to produce an overall picture of South African impairment testing disclosures and therefore a 
descriptive approach is considered appropriate. 
 
The key gap in the literature that this paper seeks to fill is the absence of a survey of goodwill 
impairment testing practices by South African entities.  South Africa is a leading accounting nation 
as evidenced by its membership of the Global Accounting Alliance 
(www.globalaccountingalliance.com) and therefore insights into its goodwill impairment testing 
disclosures should be of interest.  It is, however, also a country in which the reputation of the 
accounting profession has recently been tarnished with several prominent accounting scandals - 
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Steinhoff, EOH, Tongaat, VBS, Resilient (Crotty, 2019).  Considering the scope for managerial 
discretion and auditor acquiescence in goodwill impairment testing it is suggested the scope of this 
paper is timely and relevant. 
 
3. Significant data and methodology used 
The objective of, and approach followed in, this paper is aligned with the rationale of D’Alauro 
(2013) who suggests that disclosure can be seen as a “litmus test” indicating the faithfulness with 
which firms have conducted the impairment test.  The author finds a positive correlation between 
the level of impairment test disclosures and the magnitude of goodwill impairments by entities 
with market indications of goodwill impairment.  However, the contrary finding of Kabir, Rahman, 
& Su (2017) is acknowledged, that firms with an understated goodwill impairment loss have higher 
goodwill impairment test-related disclosures and vice versa – disclosures are seen to be used to 
enhance the credibility of the goodwill impairment loss when it is understated. 
 
This paper reviews the goodwill disclosures of 83 South African entities in the All Share Index 
with goodwill balances exceeding 1% of the value of total assets. The initial population consisted 
of the 134 domestic entities in the JSE All Share Index (JSE, 2018a).  The All Share Index was 
selected as it was designed to represent the performance of South African companies and accounts 
for 99% of the full market capital value of all ordinary securities listed on the JSE (FTSE Russell, 
2019). Included in the 163 entities comprising the index are 29 entities incorporated under the 
legislation of other countries.  The objective of this paper is to review South African compliance 
levels and therefore these foreign entities have been excluded and the scope limited to domestic 
entities.  A domestic entity is a limited company incorporated in the Republic of South Africa, 
subject to the provisions of the Companies Act, 2008, and audited by an auditor registered with 
the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors.   
 
The financial statements for the financial year-ends in 2018 were obtained from the investor 
relations website of each of the 134 South African entities and reviewed to assess the level of 
goodwill.  One entity was a recent spinoff not due to prepare its initial financial statements until 
2019.  29 entities were excluded as they had no goodwill and a further 21 had a goodwill balance 
representing less than 1% of total assets. Materiality is an appropriate consideration when 
7 
 
reviewing compliance with IFRS disclosure requirement.  Paragraph 31 of IAS 1 empowers an 
entity not to provide a disclosure required by a standard if the resulting information is not material.  
It is clarified that this exemption on the grounds of immateriality applies even when a standard 
contains a list of specific requirements as is the case with IAS 36 paragraph 134.  A goodwill 
materiality threshold of 1% of total assets has therefore been used as a filter to eliminate entities 
where the immateriality of goodwill might be offered as justification for non-compliance. This 1% 
of total assets is consistent with the level used by PWC in its 2018 audit of Tradehold Limited 
(Tradehold, 2018).  (PWC being the only audit firm seen to disclose materiality and Tradehold 
Limited being the only entity where total assets were used as the basis for determining materiality.)  
A 1% threshold is also aligned with the 1.1% average of the midpoints of the ranges used by eight 
major U.S. audit firms surveyed by Eilifsen and Messier (2015). 
 
The financial statements of the remaining 83 entities were reviewed against the disclosure 
requirements detailed in paragraph 134 of IAS 36 (IASB, 2018a). The specific disclosures required 
by paragraph 134 for those CGUs or groups of units assessed to be significant which have been 
reviewed in this paper are: 
(a) the goodwill carrying amount;  
(c) the basis used to determine the recoverable amount;  
(d) if VIU has been used, then:  
(i) each key assumption on which cash flow projections have been based;  
(ii) a description of the approach followed to determine the value of each key 
assumption and whether (and, if not, why not) these values are consistent with past 
experience and external sources;  
(iii) the period covered by financial budgets and, if greater than five years, a 
justification;  
(iv) the growth rate used for the period beyond that covered by financial budgets and 
justification if the rate exceeds the relevant long-term average growth rate;  
(v) the discount rates. 
 
Paragraph 134(b) relates to intangible assets with indefinite useful lives which is not within the 
scope of this paper.  Paragraph 134(e) specifies the disclosures required if FVLCD is used.  This 
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has been excluded from the scope of this paper in the interest of brevity and justified because of 
the low level of application and diversity of practice seen in South African entities.  Inadequate 
paragraph 134(d)(i) disclosures were seen to have an inevitable impact on the quality of the 
disclosures required by paragraph 134(f) if a reasonably possible change in a key assumption 
would cause the carrying amount to exceed the recoverable amount.  Compliance with paragraph 
134(f) has therefore not been reviewed. 
 
The results of the survey of disclosure practices by the sample entities pursuant to these key 
requirements is presented and discussed in the following section. 
   
4. Major findings 
4.1 Materiality of goodwill  
It is proposed that the materiality of the goodwill balances in the South African context is an 
appropriate consideration to be incorporated when reviewing the compliance with the goodwill 
impairment testing disclosure requirements.  This is consistent with the observation in the 
methodology discussion above that IAS 1 permits non-disclosure on the grounds of immateriality.  
Therefore, as an introduction to the detailed review, an analysis of the materiality levels of the 
entities covered by this paper is presented.   
 
Table 1 below is calculated from the values for goodwill, total assets, and shareholders’ equity 
extracted from the financial statements of the 133 domestic entities in the All Share Index and the 
market capitalisation obtained from the December 2018 Quarterly Index Review Paper Market 
(JSE, 2018a).  Goodwill as a percentage of total assets, shareholders’ equity, and market 
capitalisation is presented for groups of entities based on the significance of goodwill compared 
to total assets.   
 
Table 1 – Relative value of goodwill balances 
 
  Average* Goodwill % of: 
Ranges of  
Goodwill % of  
Total Assets 
Count Total Assets Shareholders' Equity 
Market 
Capitalisation  
40% - 49.9% 1 46.8 76.4 62.3 
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30% - 39.9% 5 33.7 65.2 72.5 
20% - 29.9% 7 26.1 54.6 41.6 
15% - 19.9% 1 15.3 34.0 30.3 
10% - 14.9% 13 11.6 26.9 15.8 
5% - 9.9% 22 7.2 20.1 15.9 
1% - 4.9% 34 2.7 11.5 6.9 
Total Goodwill > 1% 83 9.8 24.1 18.5 
<1% 21 0.3 2.8 2.4 
Total all Goodwill 104 7.9 19.8 15.3 
0% 29 - - - 
Total All Domestic Entities 133 6.2 15.5 11.9 
* Averages are simple (not weighted) calculated as the average of each of the percentages for each entity. 
 
Goodwill balances, representing on average for each entity 7.9% of total assets, 19.8% of 
shareholders’ equity, and 15.3% of market capitalisation, occurred in 104 (78%) of the 133 
domestic entities.  Goodwill is clearly a material asset to South African entities and therefore the 
diligence with which they provide the impairment testing disclosures reviewed below, and 
consequently, consistent with D'Alauro (2013), the integrity of impairment testing is important for 
the reliability of financial reporting.   
 
4.2 Carrying amount  
Goodwill is required, in accordance with paragraph 80 of IAS 36 (IASB, 2018a), to be allocated 
to CGUs in order that it can be subject to impairment testing.  The units to which goodwill are 
assigned should represent the lowest level at which the goodwill is monitored for the internal 
management purposes of the entity.  This presents an interesting question as to whether, and to 
what extent, entities actually monitor goodwill.  Given that goodwill is an asset that cannot be sold 
individually to realise value, it may be that entities do not monitor goodwill in the manner 
envisaged in the standard.  Possibly, monitoring only occurs because it is required by the standard.  
Carlin, Finch, & Ford (2007) raise the prospect of a mutual contradiction between the requirement 
to allocate goodwill at the level that management monitors goodwill and the constraint that this 
level cannot be larger than an operating segment as defined in IFRS 8 Operating Segments (IASB, 
2018a).  The intent behind this restriction is to prevent avoidance of impairment through CGU 
aggregation.  Carlin and Finch (2007) note the significant potential of CGU aggregation to explain 
deferred goodwill impairment.  Aggregation of CGUs at a higher level enables less volatile 
segments to offset the volatility inherent in other segments thereby resulting in greater “head 




Paragraph 134(a) of IAS 36 (IASB, 2018a) requires the disclosure of the carrying amount of 
goodwill for each CGU that has a carrying amount that is significant in comparison to the total 
carrying amount of goodwill.  Paragraph 135(a) of IAS 36 (IASB, 2018a) requires the disclosure 
of the aggregate carrying amount of goodwill that is not significant in comparison to the total 
carrying amount.  The combination of paragraphs 134(a) and 135(a) is taken to require the entity 
to report the entire carrying amount of goodwill distinguishing between those named CGUs 
considered significant and the aggregated other entities considered insignificant.  
 
Table 2 below presents the results of the survey of three elements of the reporting related to CGUs.  
First is the requirement to disclose the carrying amount of goodwill allocated to CGUs considered 
significant in comparison to total goodwill and the aggregate carrying amount of units with 
goodwill balances considered not significant.  Second, the level at which goodwill balances have 
been reported which provides an insight into whether CGU aggregation is present in the South 
African reporting context.  The third element is the nature of the CGUs reported.  This last aspect 
is not a requirement of paragraph 134 concerning disclosures related to the impairment testing 
process.  It is however, a requirement of paragraph 130(d)(i) which applies when an impairment 
loss is recognised, to provide a description of the CGU, such as whether it is a geographic area, 
product line, or business operation.  This has been surveyed to provide insights into the types of 
units on which South African entities perform impairment testing.  It is suggested that delaying 
the requirement to provide this description until an impairment has occurred is counter to the 
information needs of the users of the financial statements.  These would be better served by 
including a requirement to provide this description with the impairment testing, rather than 
impairment loss, disclosures. 
 
Table 2 – Goodwill reporting and testing levels 
 
Response to requirements to disclose the carrying amount of goodwill allocated to CGUs considered 
significant in comparison to total goodwill and the aggregate carrying amount of units with goodwill 
balances considered not significant  
  
Compliant entities: 78 
  All goodwill allocated to reported CGUs or presented in aggregate as insignificant   76 
  Substantially all goodwill allocated to reported CGUs   2 
  Initial carrying amounts on acquisition per CGU but not current amounts after impairments   1 
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  Some CGU information presented but no monetary amounts in support of goodwill allocation   3 
  No CGU information presented   1 
Total all sample entities 83 
  
 Identification of the level at which the goodwill allocation 
is reported  
Nature of the impairment testing unit Lower than segment 
Segment 
and lower 
Segment  Total 
     
Informative nature of CGU description:  24 1 23 48 
  Product group 7  13 20 
  Brand 9  3 12 
  Geographic unit 2  4 6 
  Mine 3   3 
  Hospital / product group / geographic unit   1 1 
  Product group / geographic unit 1   1 
  Casino / hotel   1 1 
  School / campus  1  1 
  Trading site / cluster 1   1 
  Institution 1   1 
  Product group / school   1 1 
Partly informative / partly uninformative:  2 1 1 4 
  Business unit / geographic unit 1  1 2 
  Legal entity / stores 1   1 
  Product group / legal entity  1  1 
Uninformative nature of CGU description:  24  6 30 
  Business unit 14  5 19 
  Legal entity 8  1 9 
  Division 1   1 
  Legal entity / business unit 1   1 
No CGU information presented:    1 
Total all sample entities  50 2 30 83 
 
78 of the 83 entities were seen to have complied with the requirement to disclose the goodwill 
carrying amount with the vast majority providing a listing of CGU balances which agreed to the 
total carrying amount of goodwill.  Two of these 78 entities reported CGUs accounting for 
substantially all the goodwill balance.  One entity disclosed the initial allocation of goodwill but 
did not allocate subsequent impairments and movements due to currency exchange differences. 
Four entities did not provide any details of the allocation of goodwill to CGUs although three of 
these did provide other information required by paragraph 134.  None of the 82 entities reporting 
CGU information did so at a level above operating segment.  50 (61% of 82) reported at a level 
below segment with 30 (37% of 82) reporting at a level below segment. Two entities reported 
goodwill at both the segment and lower than segment levels.     
 
There were indications that some entities may have conducted impairment testing at a different 
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level to that reported.  These indications included: disclosures on impairment losses at a legal entity 
level contrasting with the higher level reported for impairment testing; lists of various units without 
carrying amounts comprising a broader total; reporting of ranges of discount and growth rates.  
IAS 36 makes it clear that the information to be provided is at the CGU level.  This is reiterated 
by the ESMA (2012) enforcement order EECS/0112-09 that CGUs, containing significant amounts 
of goodwill, that were smaller than operating segments, had to be disclosed.  This disclosure was 
required regardless of the confidentiality considerations claimed by the issuer.   As an illustration 
of why this distinction matters, an entity with a significant percentage of goodwill to total assets 
(23.5%) presents, for one segment, a discount rate range of 6.0% to 12.0% and for another a 
discount rate ranging from 7.5% to 19.9%.    It is difficult to envisage how such broad disclosures 
can be of any relevance to the users of the financial reports. 
 
Considerable diversity is seen in the testing units disclosed. A distinction is drawn between units 
that may be considered to be more intuitive based on the names of the units and those where the 
names did not have any information content to a user unfamiliar with the details of the entity.  
Examples of the former are brands, product groups, geographic units, mines, casinos, stores, and 
campuses.  It is suggested that these are meaningful units that will provide readers with some 
insight into the activities of the unit.  In contrast, the use of legal entity and business unit names 
typically provides no insight into what these units do.  48 (59% of 82) entities reported CGUs 
assessed to be informative with 30 (37% of 82) reporting CGU names not seen to provide 
information on the nature of the testing unit.  Four entities spanned both informative and 
uninformative CGU descriptions. 
 
The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) (2013) urges reporting entities to refrain from 
boilerplate descriptions of the approach taken to determining CGUs and instead provide real 
specificity about the nature and reasoning for the level at which CGUs have been identified.  As 
noted above IAS 36 paragraph 130(d) only requires this information when an impairment has taken 
place.  However, in the absence of the suggested inclusion in paragraph 134, it is argued that, 
consistent with the OSC guidance and good accounting policy note practice, disclosures would be 





The retail industry provides an interesting perspective on the, arguably undue, flexibility afforded 
reporting entities in assessing the level at which to test goodwill for impairment.  Of the nine retail 
groups, comprising prominent chains of stores in the food, health, clothing, and hardware supply 
markets, only two test at an individual store or trading site level with the remainder testing at a 
higher level.  Example 1 of the Illustrative Examples in IAS 36 (IASB, 2018a) clearly indicates 
that a retail store would be considered a CGU by virtue of the independent nature of the cash 
inflows of each store.  EY (2017) notes the importance of considering cash inflows to avoid the 
common error of arguing that purchasing synergies link the stores within a chain and that they 
therefore are not independent.  The case for considering stores not independent would require an 
assessment that if a store was closed down all the customers of that store would transfer their 
business to another store in the chain.  However, Example 1 of the Illustrative Examples in IAS 
36 (IASB, 2018a) also makes it clear that if management professes to monitor goodwill at a higher 
level, then that higher level is used for the impairment testing of goodwill.   
 
It may be reasonable to have some sympathy for management in this regard.  Firstly, given that 
goodwill can be considered not to be a real asset, capable of active management and severability, 
it could be argued that allocation down to a detailed level is a pointless and time-consuming 
exercise and that taking advantage of the option offered by IAS 36 is a justifiable and, indeed, 
responsible action.  Against this it could be argued that goodwill is an integral and real, actual cost 
of the store and that active monitoring of the return on investment provided by each store requires 
goodwill to be allocated to the store level.  This would have the additional benefit that if an 
individual store is impaired the full impact is recognised by management and communicated to the 
users.  Secondly, it could be asserted that there is a contradiction between the requirement of 
paragraph 80 (IASB, 2018a) to allocate goodwill on the basis of the synergies expected to be 
realised and the focus on cash inflows in the definition of a CGU.  ESMA (2014) does not afford 
management any leniency in this regard, clearly opining in enforcement order EECS/0114-04 that 
each individual branch was to be considered a separate CGU despite the existence of some income 
which was dependent on the branded business as a whole.  Management was seen to monitor and 




4.3 Recoverable amount basis  
Table 3 below sets out the basis used by the 83 entities to calculate the recoverable amount of the 
CGUs to which goodwill had been allocated. 
 
Table 3 – Basis used to calculate recoverable amount 
     
Response to requirement to disclose basis on 
which recoverable amount determined 
 
   
VIU FVLCD Total* 
Basis clearly provided: 70 14 76 
  VIU 62  62 
  Both 8 8 8 
  FVLCD  6 6 
Basis not clearly provided: 4 2 5 
  Appears FVLCD but not specifically stated  1 1 
  Appears VIU but not specifically stated 3  3 
  Unclear which applied - data provided for both  1 1 1 
Basis provided both clearly and unclearly 74 16 81 
Basis not provided   2 
Total 74 16 83 
* Total is not the sum of VIU and FVLCD due to entities using both bases. 
 
76 (92% of 83) of reporting entities clearly complied with the requirement to disclose the basis on 
which the recoverable amount was determined.  Two entities did not provide any information 
stating or implying the basis used.  Five (6% of 83) entities did not clearly state which method was 
used.  The information provided suggests that one of these used FVLCD and three used VIU.  One 
entity provided information for both methods with no indication as to which of the two methods 
was the higher. 
 
VIU was the dominant method used by 74 of the 81 entities reporting the basis used whether clearly 
or unclearly.  Of this 74, 65 entities used VIU exclusively and 9 entities also used FVLCD. 
This 74 (91% of 81) is aligned with the findings of Carlin and Finch (2011) that 90% of the large 
listed Australian firms in their sample used VIU. 
     
It is an open question as to the extent the predominant use of VIU is an indication that it resulted 
in the higher recoverable amount consistent with the intent of IAS 36.  It would be insightful to 
understand the extent to which VIU was the only basis used, either because it produced a 
recoverable amount in excess of carrying amount, thereby eliminating the need to calculate 
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FVLCD, or due to a misunderstanding of the nature and scope of fair value.  There were indications 
that some preparers believe that fair value requires an active market.  An entity stated that VIU 
was used “in the absence of an active market”.  One entity referred to the difficulty arising as “no 
reliable estimate” of FVLCD is obtainable and another expressed a similar concern that a realisable 
estimate is “not easily obtainable”.  Such concerns would likely not resonate with peers in the USA 
who only have the option to use fair value under US GAAP to determine the recoverable amount.   
 
Two entities used the term “discounted cash flow basis” as a synonym for VIU possibly indicating 
a lack of awareness that a discounted cash flow is compatible with determining fair value in 
accordance with IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement.  Indeed, IAS 36 paragraph 134(e) requires 
certain disclosures if a discounted cash flow approach is used to measure FVLCD.  The difference 
between the use of discounted cash flows in VIU and that for FVLCD is that VIU imposes 
conditions – pre-tax discount rate, cash flows to reflect the current state and not include future 
enhancements or restructuring, and an assumption that use of budgets will be for a maximum of 
five years.  FVLCD, in contrast, imposes no such restrictions.  The prohibition on inclusion of 
cash flows that would result from future restructuring or enhancements is proposed to be a major 
reason why preparers would be expected to use FVLCD.   
 
However, while a valid practical consideration, an increased uptake in the use of FVLCD would 
raise an interesting philosophical issue.  If FVLCD, exceeds VIU and, is indeed a valid estimate 
of what could be realised by selling rather than retaining and using the CGU or group of CGUs, 
then management would maximise shareholder value by selling the CGU or group.  The IASB 
(2018b) in assessing whether to remove the requirement to exclude these cash flows noted its prior 
acknowledgement in 2004 that the VIU of a newly acquired unit would typically be lower than the 
FVLCD which indicated an inconsistency in the objective of determining whether it was better to 
sell an asset or keep using it.  In their assessment, the IASB staff express the view that the inclusion 
of the potential enhancement or restructuring is not necessarily incompatible with the VIU concept.  
They assess that the prohibition imposed by IAS 36 may instead be a means to restrain 
management’s ability to forecast unjustifiably optimistic cash flows and argue that this restraint is 
the responsibility of auditors and regulators and not the accounting standard.    A regulator, the 
Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2017), echoes this concern by cautioning 
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preparers against using FVLCD as a means to employ unreliable estimates that would not be 
appropriate under a VIU model.  The IASB staff conclude that the current requirement to split 
management’s cash flow budgets and forecasts into maintenance and expansionary elements is 
counter to the intent in IAS 36 to integrate the VIU calculation with the regular budgeting and 
forecasting process, creates an unnecessary burden on management, and may be considered to 
produce less useful information.   
 
4.4 Cash flow projection period 
Table 4 below sets out the cash flow period for which a financial budget or forecast has been used 
by the 74 entities using VIU.  It further indicates whether a justification has been provided where 
that period exceeds five years.  This justification is required as a consequence of the IASB's 
assessment, stated in IAS 36 paragraph 35, that robust financial projections are typically not 
available for periods extending beyond five years.  Management is permitted to use periods in 
excess of five years if it has confidence, and can substantiate past performance, in its ability to 
accurately project cash flows for such longer periods.  
 
Table 4 – VIU cash flow period 
 
Response to requirement to 
disclose period over which 
management has projected cash 
flows based on budgets / forecasts 













     
Initial cash flow period 5 years or less 57   57 
  5 years or less  55   55 
  Typically 5 years  2   2 
Initial cash flow period exceeds 5 years  4 6 10 
  1 to 6 years   1  1 
  5-plus years   1 1 2 
  5 to 7 years    1 1 
  7 years    1 1 
  5 to 10 years    1 1 
  10 years   2 2 4 
Initial period only no terminal period 1  2 3 
  Life of contract (under 5 years)  1   1 
  Life of mine    2 2 
Cash flow period not provided 4    4 
Total VIU entities 4 58 4 8 74 
 
A clear majority 57 (77%) of the 74 entities used a cash flow period of five years or less.  This 
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includes two entities employing the use of imprecise language, referring to "typically five years", 
which may not be considered to provide absolute assurance that the cash flow period was in fact 
five years or less.  One entity used the life of the contract which was under five years.  Four entities 
did not disclose the cash flow period used.  A further 12 (16% of 74) entities used more than five 
years for some or all of the reported units.  A sizeable minority, 4 (33%) of these 12 did not provide 
the required justification for using a period greater than five years.  These 12 entities included two 
where the cash flows were projected over the life of the mine with no distinction between the initial 
period covered by projected cash flows and an extrapolation of cash flows beyond this period. 
 
This use of the life of mine period produced an interesting observation. One of the two mining 
entities using VIU and both of the FVLCD mining entities made a comment to the effect that 
allocation of goodwill to an individual mine will result in an eventual goodwill impairment due to 
the wasting nature of the mine.  A further industry-specific observation relates to the retail sector.  
An entity that allocated goodwill to individual stores used a five to seven-year period, 
corresponding to the refurbishment cycles of the stores, with no extrapolation beyond this period 
as significant cash investments would be required.  This would be rendered moot should the IASB 
proceed with removing the prohibition on cash flows resulting from enhancement or restructuring.  
However, in the absence of such change it could suggest that impairments may result towards the 
end of the refurbishment cycle.  
 
4.5 Discount rate 
Table 5 below sets out the discount rate disclosures observed in the 74 VIU entities. 
 
Table 5 – VIU discount rate 
 
Response to requirement to disclose 
the discounts rate(s) applied to the 
cash flow projections 











      
Clearly compliant: 4 15 1 26 46 
  Discrete discount rate for each CGU 4 14 1 24 43 
  Justified single discount rate for all  1  2 3 
Ostensibly compliant: 2 12  13 27 
  Range of discount rates provided 1 8  7 16 
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  Single discount rate for all CGUs 1 4  4 9 
  Rate by geography not reported units    1 1 
  Average not discrete discount rate     1 1 
Compliant clearly and ostensibly 6 27 1 39 73 
Clearly non-compliant:  1    
  Discount rate not provided  1   1 
Total VIU Entities 6 28 1 39 74 
 
73 of the 74 VIU entities report a discount rate applied to the cash flow projections.  This 
compliance is classified into clear and ostensible compliance consistent with the argument of 
Carlin & Finch (2011) that it is unlikely that all CGUs within an entity face the same risk profile 
and therefore use of a single rate is inappropriate.  In this paper, it is argued further that provision 
of a range, particularly a wide range such as the 7.5% to 19.9% observed, is meaningless.  Without 
the context provided by the size and nature of the CGUs and a direct relation to a specific discount 
rate, users are left with more questions than answers.  Are 7.5% and 19.9% the only rates used?  If 
not, what were the other rates?  What was the relative significance of the rate ranges reported and 
other rates within the range? 
 
Clear compliance is seen in 46 (62% of the 74 VIU entities).  Clear compliance is assessed where 
a discrete discount rate is disclosed for each reported CGU.  Clear compliance was also assessed 
where a single rate for all CGUs was reported but this was justified based on a common risk profile.  
27 (36% of 74) entities are classified as ostensibly compliant.  Ostensible compliance results from 
the use of ranges of discount rates (16), a single rate for all CGUs (nine), reporting rates by 
geography instead of the units used in the impairment testing (one), and use of average discount 
rates (one). 
 
The JSE (2017) reminds issuers that a pre-tax discount rate is to be used.  Just over half the entities, 
39, confirmed the use of a pre-tax rate with six (8% of 74) ignoring this requirement and using a 
post-tax rate.  One entity reported the use of both pre- and after-tax rates for different CGUs.  
Paragraph 134 does not require the entity to confirm that the rate used was before tax - presumably, 
the clear directive in paragraph 55 to use a pre-tax rate is considered to render such confirmation 
redundant.  A significant 28 (38% of 74) of the entities did not state that they had used a pre-tax 




IAS 36 provides a choice in dealing with the effect of inflation (paragraph 40) and risk (paragraph 
55) – either the discount rate is adjusted, or the projected cash flows are.  Again, in the absence of 
specific clarification the user may be left believing, but not sure, that the entity has followed the 
typical approach of including risk and inflation factors in the discount rate.  A surprisingly low 
discount rate could be because the entity has adjusted cash flows for risk and inflation, but it could 
also be due to the use of an inappropriately low rate by the entity. A policy note clarification would 
eliminate such uncertainty. 
 
4.6 Extrapolation growth rate 
Table 6 below presents the disclosures seen in respect of the growth rate used for the terminal 
period after the initial period covered by budgets or forecasts.  Also set out are the number of 
entities providing justification where the growth rate exceeded the relevant long-term average 
growth rate. 
 
Table 6 – VIU growth rate 
 
Response to requirement to disclose 
growth rate used to extrapolate cash 
flow projections beyond period 
covered by budgets / forecasts 
 














     
Clearly compliant: 15 19 3 37 
  Discrete growth rate for each CGU 15 19  34 
  No terminal period - life of mine   2 2 
  No terminal period - life of contract   1 1 
Ostensibly compliant: 15 12  27 
  Same rate for all CGUs 3 1  4 
  Range of growth rates reported 7 4  11 
  Single rate for all CGUs 5 6  11 
  Rate by geography not reported CGUs  1  1 
Compliant clearly and ostensibly 30 31 3 64 
Clearly non-compliant:   10 10 
  Not clear rate is for terminal period   4 4 
  Growth rate not provided   6 6 
Total VIU entities 30 31 13 74 
 
Compliance with the growth rate disclosure requirement is lower than that observed for the 
discount rate with six (8% of 74) not providing a growth rate.  A further four (5%) reported a 
growth rate but it was not clear, from the descriptions used, whether the growth rate related to the 
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extrapolated cash flows or the period covered by management budgets.  As with the discount rate 
the overall compliance by 64 (86% of 74) is classified into clear compliance by 37 (50% of 74) 
and ostensible compliance by 27 (36%).   Similar considerations to those adopted for the discount 
rates were used in assessing clear or ostensible compliance. Clear compliance is indicated where 
each CGU disclosed had a unique growth rate.  It was also indicated where a growth rate was not 
relevant as there was no terminal period which was the case with the two mining entities and an 
entity projecting cash flows over the life of the contract.  In contrast, ostensible compliance is 
assessed where entities reported a range of growth rates suggesting that disclosure was not at the 
level that the impairment test was conducted (11).  Others provided a single growth rate for all 
CGUs (11) or provided individual growth rates which were all the same (four).  In one instance 
the growth rates were by geographic area rather than the reported units.   
 
Paragraph 134(d)(iv) requires the entity to justify growth rates that exceed the long-term average 
for the applicable product, industry, country, or market but does not explicitly require the entity to 
indicate whether or not the growth rate used does not exceed the appropriate benchmark.  As a 
result, it is not possible to assess whether no comment means that the growth rate is below the 
long-term average or the entity has merely chosen to ignore the requirement.  This was the case 
for 30 (49%) of the 61 entities reporting growth rates with 31 (51%) providing a positive assertion 
that the growth rate was conservative or did not exceed long-term trends.  It is suggested that the 
confidence with which users reviewed the growth rate would be enhanced if more entities adopted 
this practice. 
 
4.7 Cash flow assumptions 
Table 7 below presents an assessment of the information value of cash flow assumptions if any, 
provided by the entities in the sample.  The disclosures were reviewed and classified as none, 
minimal, some or meaningful.  This classification is, of necessity, judgemental so the following 
guidance is provided as to the approach followed.  None was awarded where there was no attempt 
to describe or discuss any factors.  Minimal was awarded in cases where a cursory comment was 
provided, typically related to the indicators (sales, expenses, margins) rather than the drivers 
(economic growth, competitor activity, consumer sentiment, raw material process).  Some and 
meaningful were awarded where drivers were presented – some provided brief coverage whereas 
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more comprehensive coverage was required to be considered meaningful. 
 
Table 7 – VIU cash flow assumptions 
 
Assessment of response to requirement to disclose each key requirement on which 
management has based its cash flow projections 
  
Good or some effort at disclosure  19 
  Meaningful - comprehensive coverage afforded key drivers of cash flows  10 
  Some - brief coverage afforded key drivers of cash flows    9 
Weak or no effort at disclosure  55 
  Minimal - cursory comment typically covering indicators not drivers  39 
  None - no attempt at factors other than discount and growth rates  16 
Total VIU entities  74 
 
The vast majority of reporting entities either made no attempt or any substantive effort to provide 
meaningful information on the assumptions underpinning the cash flows.  Typically, what is 
provided as assumptions is the information on cash flow periods, terminal value growth rate, and 
discount rates required by paragraphs 134(d)(iii–v).  This is consistent with the finding of the 
Financial Reporting Council (2017) in the United Kingdom that discount and growth rates are 
often the only key assumptions provided.  Paragraph 134(d)(i) clearly requires disclosure of the 
key assumptions on which management has based its cash flow projections.  IAS 36 contains an 
illustrative example of the types of information that would be expected to comply with these 
disclosure requirements (IASB, 2018a).  These are budgeted gross margins, government bond 
rates, currency exchange rates, raw materials price inflation, and budgeted market share.  BC209 
clarifies that the IASB is not expecting the values associated with the assumptions be provided but 
rather a description and discussion is sufficient.   
 
Weak or no effort at disclosure was observed for 55 (74% of 74) entities.  A majority, 39 (53%) 
of the 74 entities provided minimal disclosures on the assumptions with 9 (12%) providing no 
indication of the assumptions underpinning the cash flow projections.  Good or some effort at 
disclosure was assessed for 19 (26% of 74).  Some disclosures were provided by 9 (12%) entities 
and 10 (14%) entities provided a meaningful level of disclosure on the factors driving the cash 
flows.  It is argued that this, most neglected of the disclosure requirements, is actually the most 
relevant to users of financial statements – in the absence of robust cash flow projections the validity 
of the VIU model is compromised.  It is proposed that this requirement could be readily complied 
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with for any well-run organisation – the budgeting process common to most companies would 
require an assessment of these key assumptions prior to executing the budget process.   
 
5. Conclusions 
Goodwill is a material asset for the majority of the population of 133 South African entities 
comprising the JSE All Share Index – 83 (62%) have a goodwill balance in excess of 1% of total 
assets and 27 (20%) have goodwill balances comprising more than 10% of total assets.  Goodwill 
on average represents 12% of the market capitalisation of South African entities. 
 
78 (94%) of the 83 entities appeared to comply with the requirement to report the goodwill 
allocated to CGUs although the effective compliance is lower when unclear disclosures and 
instances of disclosure at a higher level than the actual impairment testing are considered.  Such 
consolidated reporting can result in the reporting of wide ranges for discount rates and growth rates 
considered to be meaningless to users of the financial reports.   
 
The predominant method used to calculate recoverable amount was VIU, with 74 (91% of the 81 
reporting entities) using VIU. It is not clear whether this was in fact the higher of VIU and FVLCD 
or the only method used.    The apparent 86% rate of compliance by 64 of the 74 VIU entities with 
the requirement to disclose the growth rate used for the period after management’s budgets was 
noted to mask a higher rate of ineffective compliance due to disclosure of single rates for all CGUs 
and a, often wide, range of rates.  The gap between effective and apparent compliance was even 
higher for the requirement to disclose the discount rate used.  Although only one entity did not 
disclose the rate used, the effective rate of compliance declined to 62% (46 of 74 VIU entities) 
when adjusted for the reporting of single rates for all CGUs or ranges of discount rates.  Use of a 
post-tax rate, directly counter to the required pre-tax rate, was disclosed by 6 (8%) of the 74 VIU 
entities reviewed. 
 
The weakest compliance was seen in, what, it is proposed, is the most useful information to users 
and readily accessible to preparers, the requirement to disclose the key assumptions used to 
determine the cash flow projections.  The majority, 55 (74%) of the 74 VIU entities, provided no, 
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or minimal, essentially meaningless, disclosures.   
 
The overall level of compliance with the requirements of paragraph 134 is assessed to be poor 
despite the materiality of goodwill to a majority of the entities. This is consistent with the 
observation of the JSE in their reports of the proactive monitoring of financial statements.  In both 
2017 (JSE, 2018b) and 2018 (JSE, 2019) the disclosures required by IAS 36 paragraphs 130 to 
134 were listed as the second most commonly omitted disclosures.  The causes of this non-
compliance are not known but can be speculated to be: a lack of knowledge and understanding of 
the detailed requirements; disregard of the requirements either in an attempt to thwart too close a 
review of goodwill and the impairment testing process or in the belief that these disclosures are of 
no, or limited, use to their stakeholders and are therefore not justified on a cost-benefit basis. 
 
This paper seeks to provide an initial perspective for a deeper analysis of the reliability of the value 
of goodwill in the financial statements of South African entities.  It is suggested that answers to 
the following six questions would support a deeper understanding of the reliability of goodwill 
accounting.  One; to what degree are South African entities complying with the disclosure 
requirements of paragraph 130 (distinct from the paragraph 134 disclosures reviewed in this paper 
which relate to the annual testing process) when an impairment loss is recognised in the accounting 
period?  Paragraph 130 disclosures, which are only applicable when an impairment is recognised 
require disclosure of the events and circumstances that led to the impairment loss.  Two; do 
financial analysts find the disclosures mandated by paragraph 134 that were reviewed in this paper 
to be of value in evaluating the reliability of goodwill?  Allied to this question, what other metrics 
do financial analysts use to assess whether the carrying amount of goodwill is supported by the 
entity's financial outlook?  Three; do indications of delayed or avoided impairments exist in the 
South African environment similar to those seen in other jurisdictions?  Four; does the market 
reaction to impairment events suggest that the market places reliance on the impairment test or 
alternatively the market has already recognised the economic impairment ahead of the accounting 
impairment event?  Five; do the values disclosed seem appropriate and reasonable in comparison 
to the values disclosed by peer entities?  Six; what impact, if any, appears to be exerted by the 
choice of auditor on the observations derived from these questions?  Answers to these questions 
would be expected to provide meaningful insights into the reliability of goodwill accounting, 
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specifically, and financial reporting more generally, in South Africa. 
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